Resilience: Cloudy without a chance of meatballs
In the wake of AWS’s major US-East-1 incident of December 7th, 2021, I’ve fielded plenty of panicked client inquiry about whether anyone can trust any cloud provider, whether the availability zone model actually works, and whether or not the customer’s current architecture offers adequate resilience for their needs.
I’ve also dealt with more than a handful of journalists who have wanted to push a narrative that AWS customers are fleeing in droves and/or are going multicloud as a result of that outage. Every story I’ve read on that subject has tried its darnedest to imply something which just isn’t true. Yes, many organizations use multiple cloud providers. No, they don’t do so for resilience, but rather, because differing preferences within the organization have led to adopting more than one provider.
The fact that it’s now more than two months since the outage and I’m still talking about it with clients (and my colleagues are too) does reflect how large it looms in the mind of customers — including customers of other cloud providers — though. Indeed, it looms large in the mind of many AWS customers who were not affected, either because they don’t run in US-East-1 or because their failover to another region worked as planned.
At this point, not only have my colleagues and I talked to quite a few organizations but we’ve also talked to providers of disaster recovery software and services. Thus far, it appears that customers that had problems with cross-region recovery during the 12/7/21 incident either violated AWS best practices for such, or violated their vendor’s advice.
That’s not to say that there weren’t two important unpleasant surprises in terms of US-East-1 dependencies:
- The global console URL was pointing to US-East-1 alone (rather than being geo load balanced or the like, which most people would probably have assumed). Customers could get around this by going to a regional console URL instead. I believe (but haven’t confirmed) AWS has now introduced a truly global endpoint with the introduction of the new console experience.
- Route 53 and Cloudfront’s control plane APIs are hosted solely in US-East-1. People reasonably expect to be able to make DNS changes during an outage, even though AWS advises that you use health checks for your failover instead.
Either of those two things could have thrown a wrench into cross-region recovery, along with needing to create new S3 buckets (the global namespace conflict checks are done against US-East-1), needing very specific instance types in short supply in the target region, needing to create new IAM roles (which are first created in US-East-1 and then replicated to other regions), and depending on the legacy STS global namespace (also US-East-1 dependent). But by and large, cross-region recovery worked as expected.
Now, there are certainly plenty of people who can’t do fast failover into another region and who therefore sat tight and suffered through the incident, and there’s a nontrivial number of customers who haven’t laid foundations for disaster recovery (however slowly) into another region. I get it — being able to do this kind of recovery requires an investment. You want cloud providers to be so resilient that you don’t need to make that investment yourself. But hope is not a strategy, here.
But the sky did not fall, and the sky is not falling. Cloud has not suddenly become less attractive or significantly more risky. AZ architectures work, but as always, problems with regional services (which are already designed to be multi-AZ) mean that multi-AZ might not be enough for the most critical applications. Cross-region failover works, when properly architected. (Fast and seamless failover and failback are critical, though; major cloud incidents to date have generally been multi-hour, but not multi-day. If you can’t fail over easily and fail back without a lot of effort, you tend to just wait out the outage and hope it’s short.)
Yes, there were significant problems for many customers in US-East-1. API Gateway was essentially down, and many people are dependent on API Gateway to invoke Lambda, and tons of customers use Lambda in a mission-critical fashion. Amazon Connect also depends on API Gateway, and it was also affected. (Other casualties of the backend network issues: ELB launches, S3 private endpoints, Fargate APIs impacting container launches, STS for EKS, and the support APIs.) But EC2 virtual machines continued to function just fine (although you couldn’t launch new ones). The overwhelming majority of AWS services in the region continued to operate unimpacted, and customers who did not have dependencies on affected services were able to continue operating in the region.
In a way, this was a stark demonstration of how much cloud outages are usually confined to specific services… but if a down service is critical to your application, you’re probably boned unless you have a workaround or you can failover into another region. Unfortunately, far too many customers persist in planning as if physical data center failure was the most likely event. (AWS had one of those in December, too — a power outage in a single data center, thus impacting a percentage of infrastructure in one of the six US-East-1 AZs.)
Yes, the incident was a wake-up call for a lot of cloud customers, and it was a rallying cry for on-premises server-huggers. However, not only is the sky not falling, but there should be no anticipation that it will rain meatballs.
I wrote a number of blog posts months before this outage:
- The cloud is NOT just someone else’s computer
- Multicloud failover is almost always a terrible idea
- Improving cloud resilience through stuff that works
and I still firmly stand by those posts now. (Importantly, I still believe multicloud for resilience is almost always impractical. Successful implementations are vanishingly rare and have horrible drawbacks.) Indeed, I’d been working on a piece of Gartner research with my colleagues Kevin Matheny (who covers application architecture), Stanton Cole and Fintan Quinn (who cover backup and DR), which I’m glad to say has finally published:
Designing Availability and Resilience for Applications in Public Cloud IaaS and PaaS (Gartner for Technical Professionals paywall)
In this, you’ll find what I hope is a pragmatic set of guidance advising that you figure out how critical an application is, and then choose your availability approach and your failover approach accordingly — and not forget the critical importance of designing and implementing resilience within your application. It’s got a lengthy dissection of all the things that can go wrong in the cloud, and what you should be thinking about when you architect. It also contains a sample architectural standard that cloud governance teams can provide to application architects to help them make these decisions. (The main doc runs 65 pages. The impatient will probably find the architectural standard, which is fairly short, to be easier reading.)
Five-P factors for root cause analysis
One of the problems in doing “root cause analysis” within complex systems is that there’s almost never “one bad thing” that’s truly at the root of the problem, and talking about the incident as if there’s One True Root is probably not productive. It’s important to identify the full range of contributing factors, so that you can do something about those elements individually as well as de-risking the system as a whole.
I recently heard someone talk about struggling to shift the language in their org around root cause, and it occurred to me that adapting Macneil’s Five P factors model from medicine/psychology would be very useful in SRE “blameless postmortems” (or traditional ITIL problem management RCAs). I’ve never seen anything about using this model in IT, and a casual Google search turned up nothing, so I figured I’d write a blog post about it.
The Five Ps (described in IT terms) — well, really six Ps, a problem and five P factors — are as follows:
- The presenting problem is not only the core impact, but also its broader consequences, which all should be examined and addressed. For instance, “The FizzBots service was down” becomes “Our network was unstable, resulting in FizzBots service failure. Our call center was overwhelmed, our customers are mad at us, and we need to pay out on our SLAs.”
- The precipitating factors are the things that triggered the incident. There might not be a single trigger, and the trigger might not be a one-time event (i.e. it could be a rising issue that eventually crossed a threshold, such as exhaustion of a connection pool or running out of server capacity). For example, “A network engineer made a typo in a router configuration.”
- The perpetuating factors are the things that resulted in the incident continuing (or becoming worse), once triggered. For instance, “When the network was down, application components queued requests, ran out of memory, crashed, and had to be manually recovered.”
- The predisposing factors are the long-standing things that made it more likely that a bad situation would result. For instance, “We do not have automation that checks for bad configurations and prevents their propagation.” or “We are running outdated software on our load-balancers that contains a known bug that results in sometimes sending requests to unresponsive backends.”
- The protective factors are things that helped to limit the impact and scope (essentially, your resilience mechanisms). For instance, “We have automation that detected the problem and reverted the configuration change, so the network outage duration was brief.”
- The present factors are other factors that were relevant to the outcome (including “where we got lucky”). For instance, “A new version of an application component had just been pushed shortly before the network outage, complicating problem diagnosis,” or “The incident began at noon, when much of the ops team was out having lunch, delaying response.”
If you think about the October 2021 Facebook outage in these terms, the presenting problem was the outage of multiple major Facebook properties and their attendant consequences. The precipitating factor was the bad network config change, but it’s clearly not truly the “root cause”. (If your conclusion is “they should fire the careless engineer who made a typo”, your thinking is Wrong.) There were tons of contributing factors, all of which should be addressed. “Blame” can’t be laid at the feet of anyone in particular, though some of the predisposing and perpetuating factors clearly had more impact than others (and therefore should be addressed with higher priority).
I like this terminology because it’s a clean classification that encompasses a lot of different sorts of contributing factors, and it’s intended to be used in situations that have a fair amount of uncertainty to them. I think it could be useful to structure incident postmortems, and I’d be keen to know how it works for you, if you try it out.
Don’t be surprised when “move fast and break things” results in broken stuff
Of late, I’ve been talking to a lot of organizations that have learned cloud lessons the hard way — and even more organizations who are newer cloud adopters who seem absolutely determined to make the same mistakes. (Note: Those waving little cloud-repatriation flags shouldn’t be hopeful. Organizations are fixing their errors and moving on successfully with their cloud adoption.)
If your leadership adopts the adage, “Move fast and break things!” then no one should be surprised when things break. If you don’t adequately manage your risks, sometimes things will break in spectacularly public ways, and result in your CIO and/or CISO getting fired.
Many organizations that adopt that philosophy (often with the corresponding imposition of “You build it, you run it!” upon application teams) not only abdicate responsibility to the application teams, but they lose all visibility into what’s going on at the application team level. So they’re not even aware of the risks that are out there, much less whether those risks are being adequately managed. The first time central risk teams become aware of the cracks in the foundation might be when the building collapses in an impressive plume of dust.
(Note that boldness and the willingness to experiment are different from recklessness. Trying out new business ideas that end up failing, attempting different innovative paths for implementing solutions that end up not working out, or rapidly trying a bunch of different things to see which works well — these are calculated risks. They’re absolutely things you should do if you can. That’s different from just doing everything at maximum speed and not worrying about the consequences.)
Just like cloud cost optimization might not be a business priority, broader risk management (especially security risk management) might not be a business priority. If adding new features is more important than address security vulnerabilities, no one should be shocked when vulnerabilities are left in a state of “busy – fix later”. (This is quite possibly worse than “drunk – fix later“, as that at least implies that the fix will be coming as soon as the writer sobers up, whereas busy-ness is essentially a state that tends to persist until death).
It’s faster to build applications that don’t have much if any resilience. It’s faster to build applications if you don’t have to worry about application security (or any other form of security). It’s faster to build applications if you don’t have to worry about performance or cost. It’s faster to build applications if you only need to think about the here-and-now and not any kind of future. It is, in short, faster if you are willing to accumulate meaningful technical debt that will be someone else’s problem to deal with later. (It’s especially convenient if you plan to take your money and run by switching jobs, ensuring you’re free of the consequences.)
“We hope the business and/or dev teams will behave responsibly” is a nice thought, but hope is not a strategy. This is especially true when you do little to nothing to ensure that those teams have the skills to behave responsibly, are usefully incentivized to behave responsibly, and receive enough governance to verify that they are behaving responsibly.
When it all goes pear-shaped, the C-level IT executives (especially the CIO, chief information security officer, and the chief risk officer) are going to be the ones to be held accountable and forced to resign under humiliating circumstances. Even if it’s just because “You should have known better than to let these risks go ungoverned”.
(This usually holds true even if business leaders insisted that they needed to move too quickly to allow risk to be appropriately managed, and those leaders were allowed to override the CIO/CISO/CRO, business leaders pretty much always escape accountability here, because they aren’t expected to have known better. Even when risk folks have made business leaders sign letters that say, “I have been made aware of the risks, and I agree to be personally responsible for them” it’s generally the risk leaders who get held accountable. The business leaders usually get off scott-free even with the written evidence.)
Risk management doesn’t entail never letting things break. Rather, it entails a consideration of risk impacts and probabilities, and thinking intelligently about how to deal with the risks (including implementing compensating controls when you’re doing something that you know is quite risky). But one little crack can, in combination with other little cracks (that you might or might or might not be aware of), result in big breaches. Things rarely break because of black swan events. Rather, they break because you ignored basic hygiene, like “patch known vulnerabilities”. (This can even impact big cloud providers, i.e. the recent Azurescape vulnerability, where Microsoft continued to use 2017-era known-vulnerable open-source code in production.)
However, even in organizations with central governance of risk, it’s all too common to have vulnerability management teams inform you-build-it-you-run-it dev teams that they need to fix Known Issue X. A busy developer will look at their warning, which gives them, say, 30 days to fix the vulnerability, which is within the time bounds of good practice. Then on day 30, the developer will request an extension, and it will probably be granted, giving them, say, another 30 days. When that runs out, the developer will request another extension, and they will repeat this until they run out the extension clock, whereupon usually 90 days or more have elapsed. At that point there will probably be a further delay for the security team to get involved in an enforcement action and actually fix the thing.
There are no magic solutions for this, especially in organizations where teams are so overwhelmed and overworked that anything that might possibly be construed as optional or lower-priority gets dropped on the floor, where it is trampled, forgotten, and covered in old chewing gum. (There are non-magical solutions that require work — more on that in future research notes.)
Moving fast and breaking things takes a toll. And note that sometimes what breaks are people, as the sheer number of things they need to cope with overload their coping mechanisms and they burn out (either in impressive pillars or flame, or quiet extinguishment into ashes).
Improving cloud resilience through stuff that works
As I noted in a previous blog post, multicloud failover is almost always a terrible idea. While the notion that an entire cloud provider can go dark for a lengthy period of time (let’s say a day or more) is not entirely impossible, it’s the least probable of the many ways that an application can experience failure. Humans tend to over-index on catastrophic but low-probability events, so it’s not especially shocking that people fixate on the possibility, but before you spend precious people-effort (not to mention money) on multicloud failover, you should first properly resource all the other things you could be doing to improve your resilience in the cloud.
As I noted previously, five core things impact cloud resilience: physical design, logical (software) design, implementation quality, deployment processes, and operational processes. So you should select your cloud provider carefully. Some providers have a better track record of reliability than others — often related directly in differences in the five core resilience factors. I’m not suggesting that this be a primary selection criterion, but the less reliable your provider, the more you’re going to have to pour effort into resilience, knowing that the provider’s failures are going to test you in the real world. You should care most about the failure of global dependencies (identity, security certificates, NTP, DNS, etc.) that can affect all services worldwide, followed by multi-region failures (especially those that affect an entire geography).
However, those things aren’t just important for cloud providers. They also affect you, the application owner, and the way you should design, implement, update, and operate your application — whether that application is on-premises or in the cloud. Before you resort to multicloud failover, you should have done all of the below and concluded that you’ve already maximized your resilience via these techniques and still need more.
Start with local HA. When architecting a mission-critical application, design it to use whatever HA capabilities are available to you within an availability zone (AZ). Use a clustered (and preferably scale-out) architecture for the stuff you build yourself. Ensure you maximize the resilience options available from the cloud services.
Build good error-handling into your application. Your application should besmart about the way it handles errors, either from other application components or from cloud services (or other third-party components). It should exhibit polite retry behavior and implement circuit breakers to try to limit cascading failures. It should implement load-shedding, in recognition of the fact that rejecting excessive requests so that the requests that can be served receive decent performance is better than just collapsing into non-responsiveness. It should have fallback mechanisms for graceful degradation, to limit impact on users.
Architect the application’s internals for resilience. Techniques such as partitions and bulkheads are likely going to be reserved for larger-scale applications, but are vital for limiting the blast radius of failures. (If you have no idea what any of this terminology means, read Michael Nygard’s “Release It!” — in my personal opinion, if you read one book about mission-critical app design, that should probably be the one.)
Use multiple AZs. Run your application active-active across at least two, and preferably three, AZs within each region that you use. (Note that three can be considerably harder than two because most cloud provider services natively support running in two AZs simultaneously but not three. But that’s a far easier problem than multicloud failover.)
Use multiple regions. Run your application active-active across at least two, and preferably three regions. (Again, two is definitely much easier than three, due to a cloud service’s cross-region support generally being two regions.) If you can’t do that, do fast fully-automated regional failover.
Implement chaos engineering. Not only do you need to thoroughly test in your dev/QA environment to determine what happens under expected failure conditions, but you also need to experiment with fault injection in your production environment where there are complex unpredictable conditions that may cause unexpected failures. If this sounds scary and you expect it’ll blow up in your face, then you need to do a better job in the design and implementation of your application. Forcing constant failures into production systems (ala Netflix’s famed Chaos Monkey) helps you identify all the weak spots, builds resilience, and should help give you confidence that things will continue to work when cloud issues arise.
It’s really important to treat resilience as a systems concern, not purely an infrastructure concern. Your application architecture and implementation need to be resilient. If your developers can’t be trusted to write continuously available applications, imposing multicloud portability requirements (and attendant complexity) upon them will probably add to your operational risks.
And I’m not kidding about the chaos engineering. If you’re not mature enough for chaos engineering, you’re not mature enough to successfully implement multicloud failover. If you don’t routinely shoot your own AZs and regions, kill access to services, kill application components, make your container hosts die, deliberately screw up your permissions and fail-closed, etc. and survive that all without worrying, you need to go address your probable risks of failure that have solutions of reasonable complexity, before you tackle the giant complex beast of multicloud failover to address the enormously unlikely event of total provider failure.
Remember that we’re trying to achieve continuity of our business processes and not continuity of particular applications. If you’ve done all of the above and you’re still worried about the miniscule probability of total provider failure, consider building simple alternative applications in another cloud provider (or on-premises, or in colo/hosting). Such applications might simply display cached data, or queue transactions for later processing. This is almost always easier than maintaining full cross-cloud portability for a complex application. Plus, don’t forget that there might be (gasp) paper alternatives for some processes.
(And yes, I already have a giant brick of a research note written on this topic, slated for publication at the end of this year. Stay tuned…)
Multicloud failover is almost always a terrible idea
Most people — and notably, almost all regulators — are entirely wrong about addressing cloud resilience through the belief that they should do multicloud failover because, as I noted in a previous blog post, the cloud is NOT just someone else’s computer. (I have been particularly aghast at a recent Reuters article about the Bank of England’s stance.)
Regulators, risk managers, and plenty of IT management largely think of AWS, Azure, etc. as monolithic entities, where “the cloud” can just break for them, and then kaboom, everything is dead everywhere worldwide. They imagine one gargantuan amorphous data center, subject to all the problems that can afflict single data centers, or single systems. But that’s not how it works, that’s not the most effective way to address risk, and testing the “resilience of the provider” (as a generic whole) is both impossible and meaningless.
I mean, yes, there’s the possibility of the catastrophic failure of practically any software technology. There could be, for instance, a bug in the control systems of airplanes from fill-in-the-blank manufacturer that could be simultaneously triggered at a particular time and cause all their airplanes to drop out of the sky simultaneously. But we don’t plan to make commercial airlines maintain backup planes from some other manufacturer in case it happens. Instead, we try to ensure that each plane is resilient in many ways — which importantly addresses the most probable forms of failure, which will be electrical or mechanical failures of particular components.
Hyperscale cloud providers are full of moving parts — lots of components, assembled together into something that looks and feels like a cohesive whole. Each of those components has its own form of resilience, and some of those components are more fragile than others. Some of those components are typically operating well within engineered tolerances. Some of those components might be operating at the edge of those tolerances in certain circumstances — likely due to unexpected pressures from scale — and might be extra-scary if the provider isn’t aware that they’re operating at that edge. In addition to fault-tolerance within each component, there are many mechanisms for fault-tolerance built into the interaction between those components.
Every provider also has its own equivalent of “maintenance” (returning to the plane analogy). The quality of the “mechanics” and the operations will also impact how well the system as a whole operates. (See my previous blog post, “The multi-headed hydra of cloud resilience” for the factors that go into provider resilience.)
It’s not impossible for a provider to have a worldwide outage that effectively impacts all services (rather than just a single service). Such outages are all typically rooted in something that prevents components from communicating with each other, or customers from connecting to the services — global network issues, DNS, security certificates, or identity. The first major incident of this type was the 2012 Azure leap year outage. The 2019 Google “Chubby” outage had global network impact, including on GCP. There have been multiple Azure AD outages with broad impact across Microsoft’s cloud portfolio, most recently the 2021 Azure Active Directory outage. (But there are certainly other possibilities. As recently as yesterday, there was a global Azure Windows VM outage that impacted all Windows VM-dependent services.)
Provider architectural and operational differences do clearly make a difference. AWS, notably, has never had a full regional failure or a global outage. The unique nature of GCP’s global network has both benefits and drawbacks. Azure has been improving steadily in reliability over the years as Microsoft addresses both service architecture and deployment (and other operations) processes.
Note that while these outages can be multi-hour, they have generally been short enough that — given typical enterprise recovery-time objectives for disaster recovery, which are often lengthy — customers typically don’t activate a traditional DR plan. (Customers may take other mitigation actions, i.e. failover to another region, failover to an alternative application for a business process, and so forth.)
Multicloud failover requires that you maintain full portability between two providers, which is a massive burden on your application developers. The basic compute runtime (whether VMs or containers) is not the problem, so OpenShift, Anthos, or other “I can move my containers” solutions won’t really help you. The problem is all the differentiators — the different network architectures and features, the different storage capabilities, the proprietary PaaS capabilities, the wildly different security capabilities, etc. Sure, you can run all open source in VMs, but at that point, why are you bothering with the cloud at all? Plus, even in a DR situation, you need some operational capabilities on the other cloud (monitoring, logging, etc.), even if not your full toolset.
Moreover, the huge cost and complexity of a multicloud implementation is effectively a negative distraction from what you should actually be doing that would improve your uptime and reduce your risks, which is making your applications resilient to the types of failure that are actually probable. More on that in a future blog post.
The cloud is NOT just someone else’s computer
I recently wrote a Twitter thread about cloud risk and resilience that drew a lot of interest, so I figured I’d expand on it in a blog post. I’ve been thinking about cloud resilience a lot recently, given that clients have been asking about how they manage their risks.
Inquiries about this historically come in waves, almost always triggered by incidents that raise awareness (unfortunately often because the customer has been directly impacted). A wave generally spans a multi-week period, causing waves to bleed into one another. Three distinct sets come to mind over the course of 2021:
- The Azure AD outages earlier this year had a huge impact on client thinking about concentration risks and critical service dependencies — often more related to M365 than Azure, though (and exacerbated by the critical dependency that many organizations have on Teams during this pandemic). Azure AD is core to SSO for many organizations, making its resilience enormously impactful. These impacts are still very top of mind for many clients, months later.
- The Akamai outage (and other CDN outages with hidden dependencies) this summer raised application and infrastructure dependency awareness, and came as a shock to many customers, as Akamai has generally been seen as a bedrock of dependability.
- The near-daily IBM Cloud “Severity 1” outages over the last month have drawn selective client mentions, rather than a wave, but add to the broader pattern of cloud risk concerns. (To my knowledge, there has been no public communication from IBM regarding root cause of these issues. Notifications indicate the outages are multi-service and multi-regional, often impacting all Gen 2 multizone regions. Kubernetes may be something of a common factor, to guess from the impact scope.)
Media amplification of outage awareness appears to have a lot to do with how seriously they’re taken by customers — or non-customers. Affecting stuff that’s consumed by end-users — i.e. office suites, consumer websites, etc. — gets vastly more attention than things that are “just” a really bad day for enterprise ops people. And there’s a negative halo effect — i.e. if Provider X fails, it tends to raise worries about all their competitors too. But even good media explanations and excellent RCAs tend to be misunderstood by readers — and even by smart IT people. This leads, in turn, to misunderstanding why cloud services fail and what the real risks are.
I recently completed my writing on a note about HA and failover (DR) patterns in cloud IaaS and PaaS, with a light touch on application design patterns for resilience. However, concerns about cloud resilience applies just as much — if not more so — to SaaS, especially API SaaS, which creates complicated and deep webs of dependencies.
You can buy T-shirts, stickers, and all manner of swag that says, “The cloud is just somebody else’s computer.” Cute slogan, but not true. Cloud services — especially at massive scale — are incredibly complex software systems. Complex software systems don’t fail the way a “computer” fails. The cloud exemplifies the failure principles laid out by Richard Cook in his classic “How Complex Systems Fail“.
As humans, we are really bad at figuring out the risk of complex systems, especially because the good ones are heavily defended against failure. And we tend to over-index on rare but dramatic risks (a plane crash) versus more commonplace risks (a car crash).
If you think about “my application hosted on AWS” as “well, it’s just sitting on a server in an AWS data center rather than mine”, then at some point in time, the nature of a failure is going to shock you, because you are wrong.
Cloud services fail after all of the resiliency mechanisms have failed (or sometimes, gone wrong in ways that contribute to the failure). Cloud services tend to go boom because of one or more software bugs, likely combined with either a configuration error or some kind of human error (often related to the deployment process for new configs and software versions). They are only rarely related to a physical failure — and generally the physical failure only became apparent to customers because the software intended to provide resilience against it failed in some fashion.
Far too many customers still think about cloud failure as a simple, fundamentally physical thing. Servers fail, so we should use more than one. Data centers fail, so we should be able to DR into another. Etc. But that model is wrong for cloud and for the digital age. We want to strive for continuous availability and resilience (including graceful degradation and other ways to continue business functionality when the application fails). And we have to plan for individual services failures rather than total cloud failure (whether in an AZ, region, or globally). Such failures can be small-scale, and effectively merely “instability”, rather than an “outage” — and therefore demands apps that are resilient to service errors.
So as cloud buyers, we have to think about our risks differently, and we need to architect and operate differently. But we also need to trust our providers — and trust smartly. To that end, cloud providers need to support us with transparency, so we can make more informed decisions. Key elements of that include:
- Publicly-documented engineering service-level objectives (SLOs), which are usually distinct from the financially-backed SLAs. This is what cloud providers design to internally and measure themselves against, and knowing that helps inform our own designs and internal SLOs for our apps.
- Service architecture documentation that helps us understand the ways a service is and isn’t resilient, so we can design accordingly.
- Documented service dependency maps, which allow us to see the chain of dependencies for each of the services we use, allowing us to think about if Service X is really the best fallback alternative if Service Y goes down, as well as inform our troubleshooting.
- Public status dashboards, clearly indicating the status of services, with solid historical data that allows us to see the track record of service operations. This helps with our troubleshooting and user communication.
- Public outage root-cause analysis (RCA), which allow us to understand why outages occurred, and receive a public pledge as to what will be done to prevent similar failures in the future. A historical archive of these is also a valuable resource.
- Change transparency that could help predict stability concerns. Because so many outages end up being related to new deployments / config changes, and the use of SRE principles, including error budgets, is pretty pervasive amongst cloud providers, there is often an interesting pattern to outages. Changes tend to freeze when the error budget is exceeded, leading to an on-and-off pattern of outages; instability can resume at intervals unpredictable to the customer.
Mission-critical cloud applications are becoming commonplace — both in the pervasive use of SaaS, along with widespread production use of IaaS and PaaS. It’s past time to modernize thinking about cloud operations, cloud resilience, and cloud BC/DR. Cloud risk management needs to be about intelligent mitigation and not avoidance, as forward-thinking businesses are will not accept simply avoiding the cloud at this point.
I am interested in your experiences with resilience as well as cloud instability and outages. Feel free to DM me on Twitter to chat about it.